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To be or not to be in the euro? 
Benefits and costs of monetary unification as perceived by voters in the Swedish euro 
referendum 2003 
 
Lars Jonung 
 
Abstract  
 
The Swedish referendum in September 2003 on adopting the euro or keeping the domestic 
currency, the krona, represents a unique event to examine the public’s perceptions of the 
benefits and costs of monetary unification. The voters chose between the two polar cases of 
exchange rate regimes: either a freely floating exchange rate or membership in a monetary 
union. Three major conclusions emerge from the analysis of the exit poll surveys gathered on 
the day of the referendum. First, the optimum currency area theory proves to be a constructive 
framework to predict voting behaviour across socio-economic groups and regions in Sweden, 
assuming voters behave in their self-interest. Second, the distribution of the expected benefits 
and costs across groups was a major determinant of their voting behavior. As predicted by 
theory, the Yes-vote was strongest among voters employed in the tradable sector, in high 
growth regions as well as among high-income earners and well educated. The No-vote was 
strongest among voters employed in the non-tradable sector, in particular in the public sector, 
and among low-income earners, the unemployed and the less educated – in short, among 
groups dependent on public-sector transfers to maintain their living standards in the event of 
adverse economic shocks. Third, political attitudes towards the European integration process 
heavily influenced the views of the voters towards the euro.  
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To be or not to be in the euro? 
 
Benefits and costs of monetary unification as perceived by voters in the Swedish euro 
referendum 2003 
 
 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
On Sunday September 14th 2003, voters in Sweden went to the polls to answer the question: 
“Do you think that Sweden should introduce the euro as its official currency?”2 Three options 
existed: “Yes”, “No” and a blank ballot. The voters decided whether to maintain the domestic 
currency, the krona, which was introduced as the official currency unit in 1873, when Sweden 
adopted the gold standard, or to replace it with the euro, the currency of twelve of the then 
fifteen member states of the European Union, that came into physical existence in January 
2002.  
 
The Swedish referendum dealt with a clear-cut choice involving both the currency and the 
exchange rate regime – a choice different from that facing the voters in any previous 
referendum in Europe. The No-option implied that Sweden should maintain its domestic 
currency based on a floating exchange rate combined with inflation targeting by the Riksbank, 
the Swedish central bank. The Riksbank, which gained independence from the executive 
authority in the 1990s, announced, at its own initiative, in January 1993, a policy regime of 
inflation targeting. The Bank set a target of a two percent annual rate of inflation within a 
band of plus/minus one percentage point to be valid from January 1995. The Yes-alternative 
implied that Sweden would be a member of the Eurosystem by replacing the krona with the 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited greatly from generous help from Hans Hernborn, Swedish Television, and Sören 
Holmberg, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, who gave me access to the data from the 
exit polls discussed in section 6. Many have offered me constructive comments: Michael Artis, Magnus Astberg, 
Ian Begg, Michael Bergman, Lars Calmfors, Per Eckefeldt, Jan Edling, Jan Fidrmuc, Jeffrey Frieden, Arne Jon 
Isachsen, Christina Jonung, Jürgen Kröger, Heikki Oksanen, Jan Host Schmidt, Kurt Schuler, Daniel Tarschys, 
Jonas Vlachos, Maxwell Watson and Geoffrey Wood. I owe a special debt to Oliver Dieckmann for insightful 
suggestions. Karel Havik has produced the charts. Sophie Bland has improved my English. The usual disclaimer 
applies. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author. They do not represent the views of DG 
ECFIN. 
2 This translation is taken from the press release of the Government on December 12, 2002, officially 
announcing the referendum to take place on 14th of September 2003.   
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euro, at the earliest in 2005-2006. The policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) would 
replace the national inflation targeting by the Riksbank. 
  
Other countries have held referendums on the Maastricht Treaty and on membership in the 
EU. However, in these cases the adoption of the new currency, the euro, was one of a larger 
set of issues on which the voters had to decide upon. The Danish euro referendum in 
September 2000 is an exception. In Denmark the choice was between adopting the euro or 
maintaining the fixed exchange rate between the euro and the Danish krone within ERM 2. 
From a monetary policy point of view, the Danish referendum did not represent much of a 
real choice. Although the Danish No-vote meant that the domestic currency unit was 
maintained, Denmark still behaves after the referendum as if it were a member of the euro 
area. The Swedish referendum is thus different from any previous euro-related referendum in 
the sense that the two alternatives facing the voters represented two distinctly different 
exchange rate regimes: either a free float or a monetary union.  
 
The referendum was the culmination of a long public debate in which the pros and cons of 
monetary unification and of a national currency were thoroughly analyzed - although Sweden 
had no choice but to join according to the EU Treaty. Two government investigations, one 
published in 1996 and the other in 2002, preceded the referendum, as well as a stream of 
books, pamphlets and articles, and a heated public debate in the media and all over Sweden. 
The Swedish economics profession took a most active part in the exchange of views, 
reflecting the tradition of strong involvement of economists in public debate.3 Foreign 
economists were involved as well.4 Their articles were translated and they were interviewed 
in the media. Issues such as the theory of optimum currency areas, central bank independence, 
the proper balance between monetary and fiscal policies, and the Stability and Growth Pact of 
the EU became familiar to many voters. In short, the standard textbook arguments for and 
against membership in a monetary union were part of the messages of the two camps – 
although given different weights and combined and blended with non-economic arguments in 
the campaign. 
 
                                                 
3 On this tradition see Carlson and Jonung (2004). 
4 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Philip Lane, Robert Mundell, Andrew Rose and Joseph Stiglitz, among others, gave their 
views on the krona and the euro in the Swedish media.  
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To a researcher in monetary economics the Swedish referendum represents a unique 
opportunity to examine determinants of the voters’ perceptions of the benefits and costs of 
two monetary regimes: a regime based on a domestic currency with a freely floating exchange 
rate versus a regime founded on membership in a monetary union with a freely floating 
exchange rate towards the rest of the world. Presently, according to the majority view among 
economists, these two options are the only viable exchange rate arrangements in a financially 
integrated world. They represent the two corner solutions or the bipolar choice so prominent 
in recent literature on exchange rate regimes.5 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the result of the Swedish euro referendum from an 
optimum currency area approach. It is structured as follows. First, the election result is 
summarized. Then the views of the economics profession on the benefits and the costs of 
membership in a monetary union are briefly considered. Next, the main arguments of the Yes- 
and No-campaigns are presented. Thereafter, the voting behaviour predicted by the political 
economy of exchange rate regimes is described. Against this background, data compiled by 
the Swedish State Television through exit poll surveys on the distribution of Yes and No 
votes across socio-economic groups are examined. The results from a number of referendums 
on EU membership are then compared with the Swedish euro referendum. The role of trust 
and history in determining the monetary regime is briefly considered. A summary concludes.  
 
 
2. The outcome of the referendum 
 
The referendum attracted a large share of the eligible voters: 82.6 per cent cast their votes, 
and a total of 5,843,788 voters participated. In ten municipalities the turnout was in the top 
range of 87.0-89.9 per cent. In some smaller districts it exceeded 93 per cent. The voters 
clearly viewed the choice of the currency as important.6 
 
The No-alternative received a clear majority with 55.9 per cent of the votes. The Yes-vote 
comprised 42.0 per cent and approximately 2 per cent opted for a blank vote. A mere 0.1 per 
cent of the votes cast were declared invalid.  
                                                 
5 See for example Fischer (2001). 
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The referendum revealed a strong geographical divide. The Yes-vote was concentrated in two 
parts of Sweden: first, Stockholm, the capital, and the municipalities surrounding it, and 
second, Skåne, the southernmost province. The rest of Sweden, in particular Norrland, the 
northernmost part, voted against the euro and for keeping the krona. In short, the further north 
and the further away from the capital, the stronger was the No-vote.  
 
The municipality of Haparanda, the main town on the border with Finland in the far north, 
was one much publicized exception to this pattern. Here the outcome of the vote was a solid 
Yes. The voters of Haparanda were familiar with the euro as it is in circulation in 
neighbouring Finland. Thus, many shops in Haparanda display their prices in both kronor and 
euros. The euro is accepted as a means of payment in most shops in Haparanda. It is generally 
held that this everyday contact with the euro contributed to the local Yes-majority. 
 
The No-vote was larger than most observers had expected, although predicted by the opinion 
polls. The result was immediately recognized as a resounding victory for the No-camp. The 
government announced that the outcome was to be respected. No attempt will be made to 
enter into the euro area in the near future.7  
 
As stated above, the referendum was preceded by many months of information dissemination 
and campaigning. The arguments advanced in this process most likely influenced the voters’ 
perception of the benefits and costs of joining a monetary union. Let us look at these 
arguments next. 
 
 
3. The economics profession on the EMU  
 
Already at an early stage, economists were involved in the debate about Swedish membership 
in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). A Government Commission report published 
1996, the Calmfors report, set the stage for the ensuing discussion, within as well as outside 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The referendum gained tragic attention by the murder of the foreign minister, Anna Lindh, a strong supporter 
of a Yes to the euro, a few days before the election. It is most likely that her death had no significant impact on 
the outcome. 
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the economics profession.8 The Commission consisted of economists and political scientists, 
and was headed by Lars Calmfors, professor of economics at the University of Stockholm and 
chairman of the scientific advisory body of the Ministry of Finance (Ekonomiska rådet).  
 
In short, the economic analysis of the report was based on the theory of optimum currency 
areas (OCA), listing the expected benefits and costs of Swedish membership in the EMU. The 
main benefits were identified as the efficiency gains from a common currency, in other words 
the reduction in costs concerning international transactions and the abolishment of uncertainty 
concerning fluctuating exchange rates within the monetary union, which would generate more 
foreign trade and more competition. The loss of monetary policy autonomy was deemed the 
main cost of full EMU-membership. No longer would the Swedish interest rate be set by the 
Riksbank to stabilize the domestic economy. Instead, the rate of interest would be determined 
for the euro area as a whole by the ECB. The surrender of monetary policy autonomy was 
regarded as associated with high costs for Sweden in the event of asymmetric shocks to the 
domestic economy. An independent Swedish currency was viewed as an insurance device.9 
 
In its political analysis, the Calmfors commission focused on a political trade-off. On one 
hand, Sweden would gain influence within the EU by adopting the common currency. On the 
other hand, the political legitimacy of the common European currency was regarded as weak.  
 
In its summing up, the commission in 1996 recommended Swedish membership in the long 
run, but proposed that Sweden should not join EMU at the start in 1999. The two main 
economic arguments in support of this view were that, in the wake of the financial crisis of 
the early 1990s, Sweden would be vulnerable to country-specific shocks as long as 
unemployment remained high and budget deficits were large. In this case, fiscal policy 
measures were deemed insufficient to counteract negative asymmetric shocks to the Swedish 
economy. The commission therefore suggested that Sweden should postpone joining the 
common currency until unemployment had been reduced and the budget had been 
consolidated.  The commission also thought that public attitudes would become more positive 
towards EMU in due time.  
                                                                                                                                                        
7 The No-vote in the referendum has put Sweden in a tricky political situation as it has no opt-out clause, in 
contrast to Denmark and Great Britain. A strict legal interpretation means that Sweden must join the euro area as 
soon as all the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty are met.  
8 See Calmfors et al (1997).  
9 See the summary in Chapter 13 of Calmfors et al (1997). 
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Eventually this recommendation became the official position of the government and the 
parliament. Gradually, however, it was modified. In December 2002 – after the parliamentary 
election in September 2002 – the government decided to launch a referendum on the euro in 
September 2003. 
 
The debate within the economics profession followed the OCA approach initially adopted by 
the Calmfors commission. As a consequence of new international research, arguments were 
added during the campaign concerning the trade-enhancing effects of a common currency, the 
impact of a common currency on capital market integration, etc. Still, the OCA theory 
remained the fundamental framework applied in the debate among economists. Nevertheless, 
the economics profession was split as different weights were attached to the costs and benefits 
of monetary unification. Thus, economists were active within both camps during the 
referendum campaign. 
 
 
4. The arguments of the Yes- and No-campaigns  
 
The public debate preceding the referendum concerned a much broader set of arguments than 
those stemming from the standard economic theory of monetary unification. Now a host of 
political views concerning the future of Sweden as a nation state, a welfare state and a 
democracy played a central role. It is difficult to do justice to the multitude of opinions 
expressed in the summer of 2003. The arguments evolved during the campaign as well.  
 
The Yes-camp stressed the economic benefits of euro membership. Trade and competition 
would increase, the rate of interest would fall, and economic growth and employment would 
rise. Sweden was so strongly integrated with Europe that membership in the euro area was a 
necessary step to take. It would be able to influence EU policies to a larger extent as a 
member of the euro area than as an outsider. It should break away from its neutralistic stance 
and play a more active role in forming the future of Europe. The euro was viewed as a method 
of insuring peace and prosperity in Europe. Membership in the euro area would contribute to 
fiscal discipline. A No to the euro would contribute to isolationism and xenophobia. In a 
globalized world, national independence for a country like Sweden is fairly restricted anyway. 
Thus, it is better to be part of a common monetary union than to stay outside. 
 8
 
The No-camp emphasized the importance of having a national central bank that could target 
the domestic rate of inflation and maintain a floating exchange rate, isolating Sweden from 
asymmetric shocks. The euro project was described as a risky one, a political construction that 
had not yet proved that it was going to survive. The slow growth on the European continent, 
in particular in Germany, and the failure to adhere to the fiscal discipline as set out by the 
Stability and Growth Pact illustrated the problems of the common currency. Membership in 
the euro area would threaten the Swedish welfare state and its present system of high taxation. 
Euro membership would force Sweden to reduce taxes and consequently the size of the public 
sector. The process of European economic and monetary integration was a threat to Sweden’s 
democracy. Crucial decisions would be moved from the Riksdag in Stockholm to Brussels 
and from the Riksbank to the ECB in Frankfurt. Swedish voters would lose power and 
influence in the event of a Yes to the euro.  
 
 
5. Voting behaviour predicted by the OCA theory 
 
Let us turn to the political economy of the choice of exchange rate regime to examine what 
patterns of Yes- and No-voting may be expected across groups in society. Our basic 
assumption is that voters are acting in their self-interest. We also assume that voters are 
informed about the consequences of alternative exchange rate regimes for their economic 
well-being and vote accordingly.10 This assumption, not universally accepted in the literature 
on international political economy, stands up as a realistic one in the context of the Swedish 
euro referendum. The long, intensive campaign, the flow of books and government reports, 
the media coverage and the lively public debate preceding the referendum provided the voters 
with an abundance of information about the effects of the choice of currency regime. The high 
voter turnout reflects the fact that the public took a strong interest in the referendum. The 
obvious conclusion is that for a small open economy such as Sweden the choice of the 
exchange rate regime was viewed as a crucial one by the voters. 
 
Once we focus on differences in voting patterns across society, the question arises: Who will 
benefit and who will lose from membership in a monetary union? Thus, distributional issues 
                                                 
10 On the role of self-interest in models of international political economy, see Gabel (2001). 
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immediately take centre stage. Although the literature on the impact of different exchange rate 
regimes on the distribution of income and wealth is not well developed, an answer to the 
question can be derived from the theory as well as the history of exchange rate regime 
choice.11  
 
The OCA approach provides the standard framework for considering the benefits and costs of 
monetary unification.12 According to this theory, the major trade-off is between the efficiency 
gains from monetary unification - that is from a completely fixed krona rate - and the benefits 
of the possibility of domestic stabilization offered by a flexible krona rate. Voters exposed to 
international trade and the international economy would benefit more than other voters from a 
permanently stable exchange rate through the increased trade created by a common currency 
and from the reduction in exchange rate uncertainty as exchange rate fluctuations are 
abolished within a monetary union. The positive impact is expected to outweigh the pressure 
emerging from increased competition. 
 
Looking across countries, we should expect fixed exchange rates to be maintained by 
countries with extremely large open sectors. Hong Kong, Singapore and city-states such as 
Monaco and Andorra are examples of fixed exchange rate regimes. On the other hand, 
countries with relatively closed economies, such as the United States and the euro area, 
should adhere to floating exchange rates.13 
 
Within a country like Sweden, neither fully open nor fully closed, the benefits and costs of 
monetary unification are unequally distributed. Voters in the tradable sector or in other sectors 
exposed to the international economy should be more in favour of the euro than voters in the 
non-tradable sector or other sectors sheltered from international influences. Voters with no or 
little exposure to the international economy, thus depending primarily on domestic economic 
and political developments, would prefer national policy autonomy. Such independence gives 
                                                 
11 The main reason for the paucity of studies about the distributional effects of alternative exchange rate 
arrangements is the lack of data. See for example Eichengreen and Frieden (2001, p. 12): “There is almost no 
empirical work that successfully measures the distributional effects of different international monetary regimes.” 
12 The OCA theory still remains unchallenged although the initial contributions were made in the early 1960s. 
The literature on the OCA theory, starting from Mundell (1961), is immense. For recent contributions, see 
among others Artis (2003) and Mongelli (2002). 
13 See for example Eichengreen and Leblang (2003, p. 805): “More open economies are more likely to peg, as 
predicted by the theory of optimum currency areas”. 
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them better insurance against domestic as well as international disturbances, symmetric as 
well as asymmetric ones, than an irrevocably fixed rate.14  
In a welfare state such as the Swedish one, voters whose income derives from wages, transfers 
or other forms of pay from the public sector are expected to favour the krona. A national 
currency would most likely be perceived by these voters as giving them a stronger political 
say than if Sweden joined the euro area, as euro membership is expected to restrict fiscal 
policies and keep taxes from rising. In particular, public sector employees should be expected 
to vote against the euro.  
 
A number of additional predictions can be derived. Voters with high incomes and higher 
education are likely to benefit more from the internationalization of product, capital and 
labour markets than low-income voters with low education.15 As high-income earners are 
better protected against shocks and disturbances than low-income earners, the latter would 
tend to vote for the insurance and protection supplied by the public sector – and consequently 
they would vote for monetary autonomy.16 Furthermore, a diversified and growing economy 
gives better protection against macroeconomic shocks than a specialized and stagnant one. 
Thus, voters in diversified and expanding regions would tend to be more in favour of the euro 
than voters in regions depending on one or a few industries and with a history of stagnation, 
that is, of adverse economic shocks. 
 
The empirical literature on the political economy of exchange rate regimes gives roughly the 
same prediction as the OCA approach. Starting from US economic and political history, 
Frieden (1994) summarizes the evidence as: “Internationally-oriented economic groups prefer 
fixed exchange rates, domestically based groups prefer floating rates”.17 In short, this is the 
pattern expected across socio-economic groups in the Swedish euro referendum. 18  
                                                 
14 The Calmfors Commission stressed this insurance aspect of an independent currency.  
15 Gabel (2001) suggests that voters with high human capital are expected to benefit from the opportunities 
created by international trade and openness.  
16 See for example Gabel (2001). Broz and Frieden (2001, pp. 328) suggest that center-right parties would prefer 
a stable exchange rate, that is monetary unification, while center-left parties would favor a floating rate. 
17 Using econometric tests to examine the voting behaviour in the 1896 US presidential election – an election 
where the choice of exchange rate system was a crucial issue - Eichengreen (1995, pp. 25-29) finds support for a 
political economy explanation of the share of votes of the two presidential candidates. His result reinforces 
Frieden’s conclusions.  
18 The theory of exchange rate regimes also supplies predictions concerning the appropriate level of the exchange 
rate to enter a monetary union. In short, according to Frieden (1994, p. 85); “producers of tradable goods favour 
a relatively lower (more depreciated) exchange rate, which makes their products cheaper relative to foreign 
goods.  On the other hand, producers of non-tradables support a relatively higher exchange rate. This also holds 
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To sum up, the “great divide” is thus between voters in the open sector and those in the closed 
sector.19 To the extent that these two groups of voters differ in their political affiliations, 
ideology, religious beliefs and geographical location, we will expect this open versus closed 
economy dichotomy to show up in other groupings of the voters as well. Of course, we do not 
expect the OCA approach to explain all variations in voting behaviour – only to deal with the 
economic aspect of the referendum.  
 
 
6. Evidence from the exit polls 
 
What factors influenced the voters’ choice of exchange rate regime? The exit poll surveys 
conducted by Sveriges Television (SVT), the public service broadcaster, in collaboration with 
the University of Gothenburg and the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, represent a 
rich data source for examining voting behaviour during the referendum. These surveys, 
known as Valu, are based on the response given by close to 11,000 voters to a questionnaire, 
covering 38 questions, when leaving a number of polling stations. The anonymous answers to 
the questionnaire were compiled, analyzed and presented by SVT during its long broadcast in 
the evening of the referendum.20  
 
The data from Valu make it possible to examine in a simple way relationships between the 
Yes- and No-votes and a set of variables – such as gender, age, education, political ideology, 
and attitudes towards the EU.21 We present tables and charts from the exit poll surveys that 
appear most relevant to the choice of exchange rate regime, thus ignoring a whole range of 
replies to other questions. The results reported here are based on straightforward cross-
                                                                                                                                                        
for international investors”. The choice of entry rate for the krona into the euro area was not a major issue in the 
Swedish euro referendum, although it emerged in the debate.    
19 In short, the expected voting behavior follows the traditional approach by economists when analyzing the 
dynamics of the Swedish economy, that is, the division between an open and a closed sector.  
20 For further information on the Swedish exit polls, which have been conducted at all national elections since 
1991, see Hernborn et al. (2002). Data from these surveys can be obtained from www.ssd.gu.se. The data 
examined in this study is from SVT Valu 2003 as compiled by Holmberg (2003), available from SVT. The data 
have been weighted in line with the result of the referendum. 
21 Similar data are available from opinion polls carried out before the election. However, these are not of the 
same high quality. Besides, we are interested in the views of the voters at the moment they made their choice at 
the voting booths.  
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tabulations. A deeper understanding will emerge in the future, when researchers will subject 
the Valu data as well other data from the referendum to rigorous econometric work.22 
 
First, we turn to Table 1, displaying the distribution of Yes- and No-votes according to 
gender, age and employment. Women were clearly more negative towards the euro than men. 
The same holds for the youngest voters. Employed voters were more in favour of a Yes than 
the unemployed, those in early retirement and students. Blue-collar workers and farmers were 
No-voters. The Yes-vote had a majority only among white-collar workers and the self-
employed.  
 
Table 2 on the socio-economic background reveals two striking patterns. Firstly, education 
and thus income is a major determinant of the choice of currency. Members of SACO – the 
trade union of university graduates – voted for the euro, while members of the blue-collar 
union (LO) and the white-collar union (TCO) voted against the euro. Secondly, voters 
employed in the private sector were more positive towards the euro than those employed in 
the public sector. This pattern is consistent with the predictions of the OCA theory as 
discussed above. 
 
Does citizenship influence the outlook on monetary unification? Table 3 gives the answer. 
Voters who were not citizens of Sweden (who nevertheless had the right to vote in the 
referendum) were clearly in favour of Sweden joining the euro. Of the voters raised in 
Europe, but outside the Nordic countries, 69 per cent voted Yes, and only 30 percent No. 
Voters with the experience of living outside the Nordic countries wanted Sweden to be part of 
the euro area.  
 
Judging from Table 4, familiarity with the euro influenced the referendum. Yes-voters had 
visited the euro area more often than No-voters. The majority of the No-voters had not been in 
the euro area during the 12 months preceding the referendum. The Yes-victory in Haparanda, 
mentioned above, illustrates this pattern as well. Exposure to and thus practical experience of 
the euro as a means of payment made voters more positive towards the common currency. 
 
                                                 
22 A detailed analysis of the voting behaviour in the referendum, carried out by Sören Holmberg and 
collaborators, will be forthcoming in the fall of 2004.  
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Table 5 reveals the issues that were considered to be of “very great importance” for the 
decision by the voters. The exit poll survey contained thirteen options to choose between. For 
the Yes-voters the “possibility to influence the EU”, “peace in Europe”, “the Swedish 
economy”, “democracy” and the “conditions for business” were the five most important 
reasons to adopt the euro. The corresponding list for the No-voters encompasses 
“democracy”, “national independence”, “the rate of interest determined in Sweden”, “social 
welfare” and “the Swedish economy”.  
 
The three highest ranked issues in Table 5 suggest that the Yes- and No-camps held diverging 
views on the impact of the euro on democracy and national independence. The Yes-voters 
viewed Swedish euro membership as a way of strengthening Swedish influence within the 
European Union, in monetary matters as well as in other areas. Adopting the euro was 
regarded as a means of improving prospects for peace in Europe as well as of boosting the 
Swedish economy. The No-voters, on the other hand, regarded the euro and full membership 
in the EMU as a major threat to Swedish democracy and to national independence, and hence 
as a threat to the nation state and the welfare state. They ranked “peace in Europe” and the 
“possibility to influence the EU” fairly low. For the No-camp, domestic control over the rate 
of interest, that is, a monetary policy fully geared towards domestic priorities, was an 
important factor behind the rejection of the euro.  
 
The role of politics, ideology and attitudes towards the European Union is also demonstrated 
in Table 6 and Charts 1-3. Three parties, the Left (formerly Communist) Party (v), the Greens 
(mp) and the Center (formerly Farmers’) Party (c), officially supported the No-alternative. 
Four parties, the governing Social Democrats (s), the Liberal Party (fp), the Christian 
Democrats (kd) and the Conservative Party (m) were officially all in favour of a Yes. These 
four parties commanded a clear majority of the voters – about 80 per cent of the seats in the 
parliament. Still, the No-voters were victorious. Many commentators thus regarded the 
outcome of the referendum as a vote against the political establishment and against the elite in 
Stockholm. Table 7, showing that Yes-voters had greater confidence in politicians than No-
voters, supports this view. 
 
Table 6 demonstrates that the No-majority was a solid one among the three parties 
campaigning against the euro, most overwhelmingly among voters of the Left Party. Two 
parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, which were officially supporting 
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and campaigning for the Yes-alternative, had a majority of voters voting No. Only the two 
non-socialist parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, had a majority of Yes-voters. The 
euro referendum was a major challenge to party discipline among the four parties that were 
active on the Yes-side. The share of voters that voted according to the recommendations of 
their parties was lower in the euro referendum than in the three other referendums that had 
been held since World War II – about 64 per cent.23  
 
The euro referendum had a clear ideological dimension judging from Chart 1. In short, voters 
on the left were critical of the euro while those on the right were ready to replace the krona 
with the euro.24 However, the economic forces identified earlier could be at work here as well. 
Voters on the left tend to be employed in the public sector to a larger extent than voters on the 
right, thus viewing monetary unification more as a threat to their own financial positions. 
Voters on the right stood to benefit from monetary unification, characterized by high income 
and good education, being employed in the private sector and living in well-diversified and 
expanding regions.  
 
The attitudes of voters towards the euro were influenced by their general views on European 
political integration and cooperation. A Yes to the euro meant that Sweden would be more 
closely integrated within the European Union. In this sense, a Yes-vote represents a more 
positive attitude towards European cooperation and European commitments. Those voting for 
the euro were also more positive towards closer European political integration, as revealed by 
Chart 2. The same picture is apparent from Chart 3, which deals with Swedish membership in 
the EU. Those voting for euro membership wanted Sweden to remain a member of the EU. 
Broadly speaking, those wanting Sweden to leave the EU voted against the euro. A majority 
of the voters, however, wanted Sweden to remain a member of the EU. The outcome of the 
referendum should thus not be taken as a vote for Sweden to leave the EU. 
 
In Chart 4 an additional database, covering the referendum outcome in each of Sweden’s 288 
municipalities, is used to explore the political economy of the referendum. Here the ratio of 
No-votes is estimated as a function of the share of “paid absence” from the regular labour 
market. The latter variable encompasses voters in the range of 16-64 years who are paid 
through public transfers for being unemployed, on sick leave longer than a year, and on early 
                                                 
23 See Holmberg (2003). 
24 Chart 1 also reveals that more Swedish voters regard themselves as being on the left than on the right. 
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retirement.25 This variable, which displays a high correlation with regions (located in 
Norrland), political adherence (left-leaning) and income (low-income), explains about 50 per 
cent of the variation of the share of No-votes as reported in the regression in Chart 4.  
Chart 4 demonstrates that the higher the absence from the regular labour market, the stronger 
the No-vote. This result is what was expected from our discussion of the political economy of 
exchange rate regimes. Voters who are protected from negative economic shocks by public 
sector transfers are expected to vote for monetary – and thus for fiscal – autonomy.  
 
Chart 4, which plots the share of No-votes in all 288 municipalities in Sweden, brings out 
some illuminating cases. The highest share of Yes-votes (lowest share of No-votes) was 
registered in Danderyd, the richest municipality in Sweden with the lowest share of paid 
absence from the labour market. The highest share of No-votes – more than 80 per cent – is 
found in Strömsund, a municipality in the inner part of Norrland. Haparanda, the municipality 
with the highest share of paid absence – more than 35 per cent – is a clear outlier. As argued 
earlier, the fact that the voters in Haparanda, bordering Finland, are used to the euro in their 
daily business is the most likely explanation of their desire to introduce the euro.  
 
To sum up, the voting behaviour found in the Valu polls is close to what can be predicted 
from the political economy of exchange rate regimes as discussed above. This should not 
come as a surprise as the arguments of the Yes- and No-camps to a considerable extent were 
inspired by the OCA approach, made well known by the analysis of the economics profession. 
The evidence from the exit polls is consistent with the view that the voters were influenced by 
their economic self-interest. Their choice at the ballot box was closely interlinked with 
ideological or political considerations as well. To the extent that political ideology and 
attitudes are related to economic determinants, economic factors will appear to have even 
greater weight in explaining the voting behavior of the euro referendum. 
 
 
7. Evidence from EU referendums 
 
As argued initially, the Swedish referendum on the euro in 2003 is unique in the sense that the 
voters faced a clear choice of exchange rate regimes. Still, comparisons of the evidence from 
                                                 
25 This variable is constructed by Jan Edling at LO, the central organization of Swedish labor unions. I am 
indebted to him for making his data available. The data set can be obtained from Jan.Eeling@lo.se. 
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Sweden with recent empirical work on EU referendums in other European countries may be 
fruitful as these were implicit referendums about the choice of exchange rate regime as well. 
We should thus expect that voting behaviour in these elections might be predicted to some 
extent by the OCA theory. 
 
In a study of the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Meon (2002), partially 
inspired by the OCA approach, shows that voters’ perception of the economic costs and 
benefits of a monetary union influenced voting behavior. Using the economic characteristics 
of French regions (départments), he concludes that regions with high unemployment tended to 
vote No to the Treaty. However, he does not find evidence that the degree of openness to 
international trade across regions in France had any impact on the voters’ choice.  
 
Examining regional variations in the referendum on EU membership in Sweden in 1994, 
Vlachos (2004) suggests that the referendum represented a choice between two different fiscal 
regimes. EU membership would limit the room for manoeuvre of national policy-making. 
According to Vlachos (2004, p. 1590), it would be identical to “a fiscal regime imposing strict 
restrictions on the national discretion to handle risk-sharing and redistribution between 
regions.” Staying outside the EU would allow more leeway for domestic insurance through 
taxes, transfers and subsidies and for more redistribution.  He predicts that rich regions with a 
diversified industrial structure should vote for EU-membership, while regions receiving high 
transfers should vote against.  
 
True to his expectations, Vlachos (2004, p. 1600) finds that “Regions with high average 
income and educational levels, small receipts of central government transfers, and trade 
patterns displaying comparative advantages towards the EU were relatively positive to 
membership.” As he analyses the referendum of 1994 as a choice between two types of fiscal 
regimes, thus focusing on the costs and benefits of a “tighter” versus a more “generous” 
redistribution policy, he makes no explicit reference to the predictions generated by the 
literature on the political economy of exchange rate regimes. However, these predictions are 
similar to those he derives. In his opinion, the Yes-victory in the EU referendum may be 
interpreted as a vote in support of reducing the size of the Swedish welfare state rather than a 
vote favouring European political integration. 
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The referendums in Finland, Sweden and Norway on membership in the EU, which took 
place close in time in the fall of 1994, have been analyzed in great detail by a group of 
political scientists in a joint Nordic project. The voting behaviour in the three Nordic 
countries was almost identical, according to Jensen, Gilljam and Pesonen (1998, p. 316), “The 
more wealth, education, and prestige a voter possessed, the more likely she or he was to 
support EU membership. People in urban and suburban areas were more likely to support 
membership than people in rural and sparsely populated areas.” Voters in the capital or in its 
surroundings were more in favour of EU than voters in the periphery. Men appreciated EU 
membership more than women. Roughly the same pattern can be established for the euro 
referendum nine years later in Sweden.  
 
Jensen, Gilljam and Pesonen (1998) and their collaborators present a descriptive discussion 
based on cross-tabulations and regressions without carrying out any explicit tests based on 
predictions derived from economic theory. It is tempting to conclude that their work could be 
improved upon by tying it closer to the theory of exchange rate regime choice, as the patterns 
they reveal are close to those suggested by the OCA approach. 
 
The voting behaviour in the Danish 2000 EMU referendum is close to the pattern found for 
Sweden in 2003 in many respects. According to Marcussen and Zölner (2003, p. 117) “a No-
voter is more likely to have a lower education than a Yes-voter, to have a job at the bottom 
end of the social hierarchy, and to be female.” However, in Denmark the No-voters were 
found at both ends of the party-political spectrum: either on the far left or the far right, while 
the Yes-voters clustered in the political center. In Sweden, the No-vote was primarily a far left 
phenomenon. Sweden, in contrast to Denmark, has no populist party to the far right. Nor did 
Marcussen and Zölner report any differences in voting behaviour according to region, 
education or occupational group. Here the Swedish pattern is markedly more segmented.  
 
In a study of the support for EU membership in the candidate countries, Doyle and Fidrmuc 
(2003) note that the impact of economic integration diverges across different groups. For this 
reason they expect to find differences in the voting behaviour of various socio-economic 
groups. However, they are not ready to predict the effects of various determinants on voting 
behavior. Instead they regress support for EU membership and voters’ participation in the 
referendums on a large number of variables such as sex, age, household size, education, 
unemployment, income and employment in a search for common patterns. They find that 
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among voters “those with high education (or still in school), white-collar occupations, high 
income, young age and living in urban areas are more likely to participate in the accession 
referenda and vote in favour of EU membership.” To their surprise, “the elderly, blue-collar 
workers, less educated, those with a repeated history of unemployment, those living in rural 
areas and also those living in underdeveloped or agricultural regions tend to be against 
accession and/or do not vote.” Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003, p. 20) are surprised by this result 
because they expected these groups to benefit from the redistribution opportunities provided 
by EU membership. Voting behavior in the accession countries is broadly similar to that 
found in the Swedish euro referendum.  
 
To sum up, assuming voting behavior is guided by economic self-interest, the OCA theory 
gives a few straightforward predictions concerning voting behaviour in the referendums on 
EU membership as well: voters believing that they will benefit from international goods and 
capital market integration are expected to be in favour of monetary unification, whereas 
voters believing they will be deprived of protection and insulation from economic shocks will 
tend to vote for a floating exchange rate, that is against the euro. Voting behavior would thus 
diverge according to sector of employment, source of income and level of education. The 
Yes-vote should be found primarily among voters employed in the tradable sector, the private 
sector, among high-income earners and the well educated. By contrast, the No-vote should be 
expected to be stronger among voters employed in the non-tradable sector, among low-
income earners, unemployed, the less-educated and those receiving public support, as these 
groups are more dependent on public sector transfers to maintain their living standards and 
their political influence. These predictions are supported by evidence from opinion polls and 
referendums concerning membership in the EU as surveyed above.26   
 
 
8. Trust in the euro – the European pattern27   
 
Judging from the exit polls, voters were strongly influenced by their attitudes towards the 
European integration process: towards the European Union, its performance, its policies, and 
                                                 
26 These results reject the view of Giovannini (1993, p. 18) “These observations lead me to the central thesis of 
this paper: there are no stable or significant constituencies for or against monetary union.” The empirical 
evidence from several EU Member States suggests the existence of a number of fairly well defined groups that 
are either for or against monetary unification. 
27 This section on trust is adapted from Jonung (2002). 
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towards economic and political events in Europe – in short, towards what is going on in 
“Brussels”. The No-side made frequent references to the problems of enforcing the Stability 
and Growth Pact, to the French and German refusal to abide by its rules, to the high 
unemployment rate and the low growth rate of the euro area, to problems of making the EU 
work honestly and smoothly. The No-side argued that Swedes could not trust the EU to carry 
out a policy that would be beneficial to Sweden, and that Sweden should therefore maintain 
its own currency, rejecting the euro. 
 
Monetary history demonstrates that the acceptance and popularity of a currency is closely 
associated with the public’s trust in the institutions that supply the currency such as the central 
bank, the parliament, the government and other elements of the political system.28 In an old 
established nation state like Sweden with the oldest central bank in the world, this trust and 
legitimacy has existed for a long time. The traditional functions of the national money, the 
krona – as a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value – are taken to be self-
evident.  
 
To replace the krona with the euro would be a radical step to the Swedish public. The new 
European currency needs a high degree of credibility before it is accepted. However, the 
Swedish public have little trust in the euro as demonstrated by Chart 5. The data for Chart 5 is 
obtained from EU-wide opinion polls (the Eurobarometer for the Spring of 2003), where 
representative samples of the public are first asked to give their view of the European 
Commission and later are asked about their attitude towards the euro. The question about the 
European Commission is phrased as: “Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust 
it?” The question about “A European monetary union with one single currency, the Euro” is 
phrased: “Please tell me whether you are for it or against?”  
 
According to Chart 5, the poll for the United Kingdom displays the lowest degree of trust in 
the European Commission. Trust in the European Commission is also low in Sweden and 
Denmark. The fact that these three countries have all remained outside the euro area is 
partially related to their low level of trust in “Brussels” or “Frankfurt”. A simple regression 
using trust in the European Commission as the explanatory variable behind the Yes to the 
euro – see Chart 5 – brings out a strong positive relationship across the Member States of the 
                                                 
28 For a brief discussion of “trust”, see Cohen (1998). The concept is close to that of credibility underlying much 
of the analysis of modern monetary theory and policy.  
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EU.29 Countries such as Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain are 
at the opposite end of the scale from the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark.  
 
History may explain the pattern in Chart 5. The United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark – all 
monarchies and stable democracies – have been independent and successful nation states for 
unusually long periods of time. The three countries have not experienced domestic political 
violence for centuries. Sweden and the United Kingdom have not been occupied by foreign 
powers in modern times. Denmark only experienced foreign occupation during World War II. 
Their domestic political systems enjoy considerable public respect and support. Their 
democratic traditions are well developed and entrenched. Public institutions are usually 
regarded as efficiently and honestly run. Domestic politicians and bureaucrats are respected to 
a larger extent than in most other EU Member States. Sweden has not been actively involved 
in wars for almost two centuries, contributing to both a strong belief that the country and its 
welfare state is unique, and to an attitude of isolationism.30 Sweden and Denmark have a well-
developed sense of national identity based on a common language, religion, culture, political 
institutions and history.31 The late entry of Sweden into the EU in 1995 is a consequence of 
this sceptical and isolationist attitude towards the European integration process. 
 
Looking at European cooperation from this domestic perspective, the institutions of the 
European integration process, and thus the common European currency, appear less 
trustworthy and legitimate than may be the case in other EU Member States where confidence 
and trust in domestic institutions are lower. This relative lack of trust in EU institutions 
compared to domestic institutions was most likely an important determinant of the Swedish 
euro referendum.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 The high correlation between trust and acceptance of the euro may also be viewed as caused by a third factor: 
a positive attitude towards the European integration process, which is transformed into trust for the institutions of 
the EU including the euro, the currency of the Europe. 
30 The experience of Switzerland is similar to that of Sweden, contributing to Swiss isolationism vis-à-vis the 
EU. 
31 See Marcussen and Zölner (2003) and Östergård (1994) for the history and characteristics of the process of 
nation-building in Denmark. Stråth (2000) describes the Swedish path to national identity. 
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9. Summary 
 
The Swedish referendum on the euro in September 2003 is an exceptional event for 
researchers of monetary unification. The voters chose between the two polar cases of 
exchange rate regimes: either a freely floating exchange rate or membership in a monetary 
union. Our analysis of the referendum provides some major conclusions concerning the 
predictive power of the OCA theory, the role of distributional issues, and the impact of 
political attitudes towards the European integration process on voting behavior. Let us briefly 
consider them.  
  
First, when analyzing the choice of currency – whether to join or not to join a monetary union 
– economists commonly start from the optimum currency area theory. As a rule this approach 
is adopted on an aggregate or nationwide basis to bring out the trade-off between the benefits 
of increased micro-economic efficiency (achieved by membership in a monetary union) and 
the costs of reduced ability of macro-economic stabilization (loss of monetary autonomy 
when joining a monetary union). As demonstrated here, when acknowledging that these 
benefits and costs are not identically distributed across socio-economic groups, the OCA 
approach may also improve our understanding of the way self-interested and informed voters 
make up their mind. In short, those benefiting from international trade and integration will 
vote for the euro, while those benefiting from monetary independence will vote for preserving 
the domestic currency, the krona.  
 
Second, as a rule the evidence from the exit polls supports the predictions of the OCA 
approach.32 The referendum demonstrates that the expected distribution of benefits and costs 
was an important determinant of voting behavior. The fear, in particular among public sector 
employees, women, blue-collar workers and the unemployed, that the euro will bring about 
restrictions on public sector employment and on transfers from the public sector contributed 
to the victory of the No-camp. In short, the No-votes originated from voters with a high 
dependency on the public sector and often with low incomes – although these voters would 
not be exposed to increased international competition. A similar response emerged in the 
Danish euro referendum in 2000 as well, where the No-camp made euro membership a major 
                                                 
32 The predictive power of the OCA approach to assess the creation and destruction of monetary unions is 
commonly regarded as low. See for example Goodhart (1995, p. 452) and Bordo and Jonung (2003, pp. 62-63). 
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threat against the welfare state. On the other hand, high-income earners oriented towards the 
international economy, employed in the private sector and living in regions with a diversified 
economy were in favour of the euro.  
 
Third, political attitudes and ideology influenced voters as well.33 The No-voters regarded the 
common currency as a threat to national independence and to Swedish democracy. They 
feared that joining the euro meant that decisions of major importance were taken out of the 
hands of domestic voters and domestic politicians and transferred to Frankfurt and Brussels to 
be made by policy-makers that were not democratically accountable according to their 
understanding. Yes-voters on the other hand were positive towards increased European 
political integration. Many of them expressed support for the idea of a United States of 
Europe. The further to the left, the stronger was the No-vote. Only the two parties to the right, 
the Liberal and Conservative Parties, had a majority of Yes-votes. Voters to the left also tend 
to be low-income earners and more dependent on public transfers than voters to the right.  
 
The OCA approach improves our understanding of how the economic benefits and costs of 
monetary unification are perceived by voters across society. However, it should be combined 
and supplemented with ideological and political factors, as these were important determinants 
of the outcome of the referendum. This remains a challenge for researchers on monetary 
unification. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
However, in this study dealing with the differential impact across society of the choice of exchange rate regime, 
the OCA theory is able to generate a number of testable implications. 
33 True, political integration and national sovereignty is explicitly mentioned by Mundell (1961) in his seminal 
contribution as determinants of currency arrangements. He suggested that these factors might not be as strong in 
Western Europe due to the creation of the Common Market. The Swedish referendum indicates, however, that 
these factors are still decisive.  
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Table 1. Yes and No: gender, age and occupation. Percentage of the votes. 
     Yes  No 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Gender 
Women    36  62 
Men     48  50 
 
Age 
18-21     26  70 
22-30     41  56 
31-64     45  54 
> 65     41  57 
 
Occupation 
Blue-collar    29  69 
Farmer     32  65 
White-collar    52  46 
Self-employed    54  44 
 
Comments: Blank ballots are ignored. They represented between 1 and 4 percent of total 
votes. 
Source: SVT Valu  2003. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Yes and No: trade union affiliation and private/public employment. Percentage of the 
votes. 
 
     Yes  No 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….... 
Blue-collar members (LO)    30  69 
White-collar members (TCO)    45  53 
Academic members (SACO)    53  45 
 
 
Employed in the private sector   47  51 
Employed in the public sector   37  61 
Of which: 
 Central government    44  54 
Local government    34  64 
 
 
Comments: Blank ballots are ignored. They represented between 1 and 4 percent of total 
votes. 
Source: SVT Valu, 2003. 
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Table 3. Yes and No: citizenship and country of childhood. Percentage of the votes. 
      Yes    No 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Swedish citizenship    41   57 
Non-Swedish citizenship   57   42 
 
 
Raised in Sweden    41   57 
 
Raised outside Sweden   59   40 
Of which: 
In another Nordic country  60    40 
In another European country  69   30 
In a country outside Europe  49   49 
 
Comments: Blank ballots are ignored. They represented between 1 and 4 percent of total 
votes. 
Source: SVT Valu, 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Yes and No: number of visits during the past 12 months to the euro area. Per cent. 
Number of visits to   Yes voters  No voters  Total 
the euro area: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Many      36   17   25 
A few     31   28   29 
None     33   55   46 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Total      100   100   100 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Comments: Blank ballots are ignored. They represented between 1 and 4 percent of total 
votes. 
Source: SVT Valu, 2003. 
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Table 5. Yes and No: issues of “very great importance”. Per cent. 
 
 
Yes voters                      No voters 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Possibility to influence the EU  57 Democracy     67 
Peace in Europe   56  National independence   62 
The Swedish economy  53 The rate of interest determined in Sweden  60 
Democracy    47 Social welfare     58 
Conditions for business  40 The Swedish economy   56 
Employment    40 Prices      51 
Social welfare      36 Employment     47 
Equality    29 Equality     43 
Prices     28 Peace in Europe    40 
National independence  22 Possibility to influence the EU  28 
The rate of interest det. in Sweden 18 Conditions for business   19 
Refugees/immigration  15 Refugees/immigration              18 
Source: SVT Valu, 2003.     
 
 
Table 6. Yes and No: party sympathies. Per cent. 
 
Party:     Yes      No   Blank   Total 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Parties advocating a No: 
   The Left Party (v)   10 89  1   100 
   The Greens (mp)   12 86  2   100 
   The Center Party (c)   18 80  2   100 
 
Parties advocating a Yes: 
   The Social Democrats (s)  45 53  2   100 
   The Christian Democrats (kd) 41 57  2   100 
   The Liberal Party (fp)  67 30  3   100 
   The Conservative Party (m)  72 27  1   100  
Source: SVT Valu, 2003. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Yes and No: trust in politicians. Per cent. 
            Yes voters       No voters          Total 
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Much/quite a lot of trust   70  44   55 
Very little/rather little trust  30  56   45 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Sum      100  100   100 
Source: SVT Valu, 2003. 
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Chart 1. Yes and No to the euro and left/right political view of the voters. Per cent. 
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Source: SVT Valu, 2003. 
 
 29
Chart 2. Yes and No to the euro and attitudes towards a United States of Europe. Per cent. 
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Chart 3. Yes and No to the euro and attitudes towards Swedish EU-membership. Per cent. 
17
65
33
5
79
94
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
                 Exit the EU                    (25%)                  No opinion                     (17%)                Stay in the EU                 (58%)
%
Yes-voters
No-voters
 
 
Source: SVT Valu, 2003. 
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Chart 4. Share of No-votes as a function of paid absence from the labor market. 
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Source:  Data supplied by Jan Edling, LO, Stockholm. 
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Chart 5. “For the euro” and trust in the European Commission. Spring 2003. 
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Source: Eurobarometer.  
 
